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Emerging market financial systems have proved to be less resilient than the banking systems of 
developed countries. Views differ about the reasons for this. Some argue that an unstable 
macroeconomic environment is the main culprit. Others blame poor risk management.  
In this note we draw on the results of a survey of emerging market central bank meeting participants to 
shed light on the possible contributions of these two broad factors to changing banking resilience. We 
explore: (1) the changing nature of macroeconomic risks; (2) new forms of risk to banks; and 
(3) whether the capacity to manage risks has improved. We conclude the paper with an overview of 
what we know about the vulnerability of the banking sector in emerging markets at this time. 
1.  The changing nature of macroeconomic risks 
Emerging economies are exposed to larger shocks than are developed countries.
2 Annex Table A1 
shows that in the second half of the 1990s, the volatility of growth in output, consumer prices, and the 
real exchange rate, as well as that of the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP, was 
consistently much higher in emerging than in developed market economies. Macroeconomic volatility 
would discourage the provision of credit by increasing uncertainty about prospective returns and 
exposing banks to potentially large losses. However, more recently macroeconomic conditions appear 
to have improved considerably: Annex Table A1 also reveals a sharp decline in the volatility of these 
macroeconomic indicators in emerging economies in the last decade, although it still tends to be 
higher than in developed countries.  
Whether the recent period of low volatility will continue remains uncertain, but a number of structural 
changes have occurred which might be expected to enhance macroeconomic resilience and stability. 
Some emerging market economies have succeeded in reducing economic imbalances, thus lowering 
their vulnerability to external or domestic shocks. As shown in Graph 1, external vulnerability indicators 
developed at the BIS
3 have broadly declined. Indicators of currency mismatches have also fallen 
significantly since the late 1990s.
4 Budget deficits and ratios of public debt to GDP have improved in 
some important emerging markets. Finally, resilience has also been enhanced in those countries 
which adopted floating exchange rates along with more stable, and increasingly more credible, 
monetary policy regimes.  
Nevertheless, a number of risks remain. First, large global imbalances - notably fiscal and current 
account deficits in the United States, and large current account surpluses in Asia - could reverse 
abruptly. A sudden correction, resulting in sharply lower global growth, higher US interest rates and a 
steep dollar depreciation could be harmful to some emerging market economies, in some cases by 
                                                       
1  Comments by Philip Turner, William White and Már Gudmundsson, helpful discussions with Christian Upper and Agustin 
Villar, and the research assistance of Marjorie Santos and Gert Schnabel are gratefully acknowledged. 
2  Inter-American Development Bank (2005, p 8). 
3  Based on the behaviour of the real effective exchange rate, the current account, export growth, external debt level and 
growth, and short-term debt in relation to foreign reserves. See Hawkins and Klau (2000, Annex B) for details. 
4  For a discussion of the relationship between currency mismatches and the severity of crises, see Goldstein and Turner 
(2004). The graph measures the extent to which the proportion of foreign currency denominated debt is offset by the size of 
the export sector, or the presence of a “natural hedge”.  
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inducing “sudden stops” in capital flows.
5 Many are exposed in addition to sharp fluctuations in 
commodity prices. 
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1    Based on Hawkins and Klau (2000); the higher the “score”, the greater the vulnerability (maximum = 10).     
2  Weighted 
average of the economies listed.     
3  China,  India,  Korea  and  Taiwan  (China).   
4    Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand.   
5  Foreign currency share of total debt divided by the ratio of exports to GDP.   
6  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.   
7  The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.    
8  As a percentage of GDP. Data not shown: 
–30% in 2001 for Turkey. 
Sources: Asian Development Bank; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; IMF; national data; BIS. 
Second, some emerging market economies still face domestic imbalances that could raise concerns. 
In China, efforts to adjust the composition of domestic demand from investment to consumption are 
having uncertain effects on bank asset quality; other countries might be vulnerable to credit to the 
consumer sector as well (see the paper by Mohanty et al in this volume). High public debts are also a 
concern in a number of emerging markets, including in India and the Philippines, Turkey and a number 
of Latin American countries. In some cases budget deficits are a related concern; in Poland, for 
example, rising deficits could adversely affect the prices of long-term securities held by banks. In part 
this could occur via a resultant need to tighten monetary policy and in part because it might contribute 
to a delay in Poland’s adoption of the euro. A more general concern is that in the current benign 
environment, domestic borrowers might become overextended and thus become vulnerable to a 
cyclical downturn.  
An additional perspective on changing exposure to macroeconomic risks is provided by central bank 
responses to the questionnaire mentioned above. Central banks were asked what they thought was 
the probability of significant harm to the financial sector in the event of a large shock today, and to 
compare this probability to what their assessment might have been 10 years earlier (Graph 2). Their 
responses give a distinct impression that banking sector vulnerability to large shocks has declined 
over this period. 
                                                       
5  A sharp correction of imbalances in the United States and China is a key element of the crisis scenario developed in 
Goldstein (2005). BIS Papers No 28  69
 
Graph 2 
Probability of significant harm to 












AA -10 BB -10 CC -10 DD -10 EE -10 FF -10 GG -10 HH -10 II -10 JJ -10 KK -10
Certain harm    
High probability
Low probability
Nil            
 
Note: A = terms of trade; B = world interest rates; C = sovereign spread; D = capital flows; E = third country exchange rates; F = 
own exchange rate; G = global demand for exports; H = domestic demand; I = domestic interest rates; J = domestic equity 
prices; K = domestic property prices. 
1    Percentage of economies which gave the answer indicated. X = shock today, X-10  = shock 10 years ago. Respondents 
comprise Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and Turkey. 
Source: Central banks. 
•  There is a perception of reduced vulnerability to shocks arising from external sources (terms 
of trade and export demand). This is of particular interest in the light of large external 
imbalances and a recent analysis that suggests that a global crisis could be triggered by a 
slowdown in growth in the United States and China (Goldstein (2005)). It is less clear that 
perceived risks arising from domestic demand have fallen; although no respondent reported 
certain harm; more respondents assigned a high probability of harm to the financial sector.  
•  The number of countries reporting certain or high probability of harm from external financial 
shocks or capital flows appears to have remained stable or fallen (see responses for world 
interest rates, capital flows, third country exchange rates and own exchange rate). However, 
a small subset of countries sees certain harm from sharp increases in sovereign spreads 
and capital flow reversals; they did not perceive such high risks 10 years ago.
6  
•  Exposure to perceived risks arising from high domestic asset prices has also fallen (see 
responses for domestic interest rates, equity prices and property prices).  
Thus, notwithstanding the impression of reduced vulnerability, the responses still indicate a high 
probability of significant harm from a wide range of (large) shocks.
7  
To sum up, while the macroeconomic environment and central bank assessments point to distinct 
improvements in the resilience of banking systems to shocks, significant vulnerabilities apparently 
remain. In this context, a key challenge confronting policymakers that may have succeeded in 
addressing old vulnerabilities is to identify and manage new ones. To provide further perspective on 
this issue, we next review new forms of risks for banks.  
                                                       
6  For capital flows, certain harm was indicated by a small fraction of respondents, whereas it would not have been indicated 
10 years previously. However, the number of respondents indicating high probability or certain harm overall fell. 
7  Questionnaire responses may also understate shocks if respondents assumed shocks would occur independently but 
instead they occur in combination.  
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2. New  forms  of risks for banks 
The resilience of banks in emerging markets depends in part on their exposure to new forms of risks 
and their ability to manage them. We focus on trends in credit, market and liquidity risks.
8 
Credit risk 
Credit operations are traditionally the main source of income as well as risk for banks. Many emerging 
market economies appear to have compensated for the adverse effects of recent banking crises on 
corporate credit growth. In line with this, around 40% of respondents to the questionnaire cited credit 
to households as an important or somewhat important source of credit risk. The following aspects may 
be highlighted. 
First, a distinct increase in credit to the household sector has altered risk exposures.
9 Although the share 
of credit to households in some cases is still small (Graph 3, left-hand panel), it is growing rapidly. On 
balance, credit risks might be expected to fall as a result of the shift to households because: (i) it means 
that there is lower overall concentration in bank assets; (ii) consumer credit diversifies risks among a 
larger number of borrowers than does credit to corporations; (iii) profits from consumer lending tend to be 
more stable and are higher; and (iv) implicit or explicit guarantees, or bankruptcy protection (all of which 
can encourage risk-taking by the borrower) might be lower for households than for corporations. 
However, a concern, cited by one central bank respondent, is that banks know less about their 
household borrowers than they do about their corporate borrowers. In any case, experience shows that 
risks in lending to households can be significant, as in the example of Korea cited in Mohanty et al’s 
contribution to this volume. Credit risk in Korea now appears to have declined because of adjustments 
following recent crises and the cleaning-up of non-performing loans (NPLs). However, stress tests for 
credit risk exposures, which are done occasionally, indicate that it is still the largest part of risk exposure. 
Another example is India, where the possibility that rapid rates of growth in credit card lending (about 
30-40% a year over the past five years) might increase risk exposures is a concern (Merchant (2005)). 
Graph 3 
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1  As a percentage of total domestic credit. First column refers to end-1999, second column refers to mid-2005.   
2  First column 
refers to end-2001.   
3  First column refers to end-2002.   
4  Estimated as a standard deviation over 1995-2004 of the year-on-
year changes of the quarterly data; for China, 2000-04, for Indonesia, 2003-04.   
5  2002 = 100. 
Sources: IMF; CEIC; national data. 
                                                       
8  This paper will not focus on operational risk. This is a new issue, and could involve significant costs to banks, but our 
inquiries suggest that domestic banks in a number of emerging markets have neither data to estimate it nor procedures to 
manage it. In the context of the discussion in this paper, a key concern is that the exposure to new types of credit, and the 
growing reliance on tradable securities and credit derivatives, as well as new techniques of risk assessment, could increase 
the risk of errors in modelling or product design, or complicate settlement. 
9  For a discussion on reasons for this shift, see the paper by Mohanty et al in this volume.  BIS Papers No 28  71
 
Second, in some countries there are significant credit risks on the banking book associated with asset 
price fluctuations. For example, households which have taken out mortgages bear unhedged interest 
rate risk and are also exposed to fluctuations in real estate prices which might be related to interest 
rate movements or the stage of the cycle. As can be seen in Graph 3, property prices in emerging 
markets are in many cases at least as volatile as they are in two developed countries where volatility is 
high (Australia and Netherlands). Cumulative changes in these prices have been large; since the end 
of 2002, real estate prices have approximately doubled in South Africa, and increased up to 60% in 
Hong Kong SAR. Risks from property price increases depend on exposures, which vary considerably. 
Lending for residential real estate accounts for around 25% of total loans in Hong Kong and Korea, 
around 19% in Hungary, Poland and Israel, but 12% or lower in Colombia and Mexico (see Annex 
Table A2). In some cases, such as Korea or Hong Kong, bank exposure is limited by ceilings on loan-
to-value. However, in Korea there is still concern that a fall in property prices could adversely affect 
aggregate demand or employment. In one country, a stress test conducted in 2004 indicates that an 
isolated and local sharp fall in real estate prices would not have systemic effects; however, the 
financial situation of many banks could deteriorate significantly if a real estate crisis were 
accompanied by a general economic crisis. One big risk to banks is that households will service their 
debts but will then cut back on spending to do so. A broader recession would then affect banks in 
other ways. The Bank of Thailand’s contribution to this volume discusses the simulated effect of a 
policy rate hike on financial stability; the risks of a disruption are limited, but market conditions warrant 
monitoring. 
In some countries dollarisation
10 is a potential source of exchange rate-related credit risks. Some 
banking systems have significant liabilities in dollars and attempt to compensate by extending dollar-
denominated loans to domestic residents (De Nicolo et al (2003), Cayazzo et al (forthcoming)). While 
banks thus hedge their currency positions, most borrowers earn in local currency and do not hedge 
their borrowing. Dollarisation is significant in Latin America, Turkey and central and eastern Europe 
(CEE). In Peru, for example, 70% of deposits and 60% of credit is in US dollars. Exchange rate risk is 
also present in the books of borrowers in Turkey, but for a different reason; in this case it is because 
companies have borrowed heavily from abroad. In Poland, an increasing share of banks’ loan 
portfolios is in foreign currency, mainly in the form of long-term loans for financing purchases of 
property.
11 Bank vulnerability in this situation is in some cases potentially limited by policy or by 
specific conditions. For example, in Chile banks are required to provision for this indirect foreign 
exchange risk. In CEE, the risks associated with high rates of dollarisation are attenuated by an exit 
strategy, which is the adoption of the euro.  
Market risk 
A number of questionnaire respondents noted that the growth in bank trading books has increased 
exposure to market risk in a number of economies; such risk was generally not considered significant 
(and was not analysed) 10 years ago. However, exposure to market risk is in many cases still quite 
small. To illustrate the range of exposures, in Korea marketable securities grew 21% in 2004, to reach 
over 14% of total assets. In Mexico, about 75% of the total risk of financial institutions, as measured by 
value-at-risk (VaR), can now be traced to market risk (from positions that are sensitive to interest rate 
fluctuations); 10 years ago the main source of risk was credit risk. In the Czech Republic, capital 
requirements for market risks (trading book, including capital requirements for the credit risk of the 
trading book) have almost doubled over the last five years; however, they still comprise less than one 
tenth of the capital requirements for the banking book (credit risk). In Thailand, the direct capital 
impact of market risk on regulatory capital is estimated at less than 1 percentage point, which is 
significant but small enough to be considered manageable. In Poland and Israel, the direct market risk 
to banks is considered small. In Poland’s case this is because the banks tend to have closed positions 
in foreign currencies, and floating interest rates apply to both long-term deposits and loans.  
                                                       
10  This is a generic term referring to the use of any foreign currency for transactions in a local market. In many countries this 
involves the use of US dollars; in central and eastern Europe, it involves the use of euros or Swiss francs. 
11  These loans are popular because they are cheaper for borrowers. See discussion relating to Figure 7 of Pruski and 
Zochowski’s contribution to this volume.  
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Risk on the trading book from fluctuations in interest rates is particularly important in some countries 
(India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Argentina, Colombia) where government securities form a significant 
part of banks’ assets (see the papers by Mohanty et al, Pesce, Vargas and Goeltom in this volume). In 
a number of countries, these holdings have been a large source of trading profits when interest rates 
were falling but have resulted in losses when rates rose.  
Stress tests reveal that banking systems’ exposure to this type of risk is also significant in other 
emerging markets, whether due to holdings of government or private securities.
12 According to one 
Latin American central bank, a 100 basis point increase in yields across all maturities would cost 17% 
of the annual earnings of financial institutions. In Mexico, the main source of market risk derives from 
long-term assets and fixed rate instruments, but a shock the size of the 1995 crisis would not lead to 
the disappearance of the capital of any bank. In 2004, another central bank assessed the impact of a 
price decline in corporate debt of 30%. For institutions that had resident enterprises’ listed instruments 
in their portfolios, losses for two types of banks ranged from 2 to 4.8% of capital, up from 1.3 to 3.6% a 
year earlier.
13 Still another central bank performed a test of dependence of the banking system on the 
public sector, in both assets and liabilities. It showed that some small banks’ capital and net earnings 
were sensitive to moderate changes in public debt prices or withdrawal of public deposits. In Hong 
Kong SAR, a stress test conducted in 2005 revealed that an interest rate increase of more than 2% 
could lead to some banks making a loss. This is because banks might not have necessarily factored in 
the interest rate or significant exposure to interest rate sensitive sectors such as property (Gimbel 
(2005)). In Korea, however, based on quantitative risk management tools such as VaR, the market risk 
of bonds was assessed as low.  
Most respondents to the questionnaire expressed no concerns about exchange rate risk, although 
direct currency exposure, while low, is in some cases significant. In Turkey, banks have small open 
positions that do not require additional capital, so exchange rate risk is much lower than in the period 
before the 2000-01 crisis. In Korea, a stress test of the impact of Chinese renminbi appreciation on 
banks’ foreign currency risk estimated the impact as low because of ex ante portfolio adjustment. In 
contrast to past episodes in which currency depreciation was the main concern, there could be risks in 
possible currency appreciation in countries where foreign currency holdings are significant.
14 
Neither were significant concerns expressed about the market risk from holding stocks, as such 
holdings are low in many emerging markets (eg 0.1% of total assets of banks in Korea and 0 in Chile, 
where banks are prohibited from holding stocks). In one country, it was estimated that the impact of a 
fall in the stock index by 30% would not entail significant losses, and this estimate had fallen; losses 
were estimated at 3.8% of capital at the beginning of 2005 against 5.2% of capital a year earlier. For 
estimates of bank open positions in currencies and equities, see Annex Table A4. 
Liquidity risk 
The analysis of liquidity risk (the risk of being unable to raise funds without incurring unusually high 
costs) focuses on gaps between bank assets and liabilities along the whole maturity spectrum.
15 An 
excess of assets over liabilities at each maturity creates a funding gap, and liquidity management 
involves securing financing to cover this gap or limit its size (conversely, if assets fall below liabilities, 
                                                       
12  For further information on banks’ holdings of securities, see Annex Table A3 and Mohanty et al’s contribution to this volume 
(Graph 1). 
13  Type 1 comprised banks that were required to calculate interest rate risk and, consequently, included market risk in the 
calculation of the capital adequacy ratio; Type 2 comprised credit institutions that did not calculate interest rate risk. The 
latter had lower estimated losses. 
14  In Chile, interest rate risk is relatively more important than exchange rate risk. 
15  In this context, recent research has formalised the idea that one reason why banks exist is that they are a mechanism for 
pooling liquidity to meet the demands of savers and borrowers simultaneously. In particular, banks can reduce their need for 
cash in response to unexpected shocks to liquidity by combining transaction deposits and loan commitments, as long as 
depositor and borrower demands for liquidity are not highly correlated. In line with this, banks with a larger share of 
transaction deposits (in total deposits) tend to extend more loans (Kashyap et al (2002)). For interbank market implications, 
see footnote 36. BIS Papers No 28  73
 
the liabilities need to be invested). Prospective funding gaps create exposure to interest rate risk 
unless hedged, as the costs of funding or returns on investment are uncertain.
16  
While data on funding gaps at different maturities are currently not available, we can get a sense of 
liquidity conditions by examining the ratio of liquid assets to liquid liabilities (liquid asset or current 
ratio
17). This is highest in banks in Korea and the Czech Republic (115% and 95% respectively), 
intermediate in Turkey, Poland, Hong Kong SAR, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Hungary (37-65%) and 
lowest in Venezuela, Israel and Colombia (23.4-29.3%). Current ratios declined significantly between 
1999 and 2004 in Venezuela, Hungary and Israel (see Annex Table A5 for liquidity ratios and other 
indicators related to funding gaps). As the preceding are aggregate data and reflect a variety of 
economic conditions, interpretation is not straightforward. However liquidity ratios might be expected 
to be higher in economies where the government does not actively intervene to meet funding gaps, 
financial institutions are risk-averse, fixed interest rates prevail or where hedging is more difficult.  
Additional perspective could be gained by examining the ratio of demand deposits to credit to the 
private sector over the business cycle and during episodes of financial stress (Graph 4). Given that 
credit to the private sector is illiquid, a rising share of demand deposits could suggest higher liquidity 
risks.
 This appears to be an issue in a number of emerging markets. For example, one central bank 
noted that low interest rates had encouraged banks to fund from short-term sources in the current 
cycle; this has deepened the maturity mismatch in the balance sheets of deposit-takers, who are now 
exposed to both significant interest rate risk and higher liquidity risk. 
Graph 4 
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Source: IMF. 
As can be seen, the demand deposit ratio has been stable for extended periods in a number of 
countries, such as Brazil and Chile (converging to around 12%), and Korea and Thailand (converging 
to around 5%). In other countries it has been quite volatile, although the relationship to the cycle is not 
always apparent. In some countries there appears to be a boom and bust process in which the ratio 
falls with rapid growth in credit during a cyclical upturn, and then rises in the aftermath of crises.
18  
                                                       
16  A complete analysis at the bank level would include consideration of “maturity ladders”, which are based on the projected 
evolution of assets and liabilities and expected gaps at given maturity dates. Goldstein and Turner (2004, pp 94-5) 
recommend that supervisors or central banks aggregate the liquidity gap analysis of individual banks to construct maturity 
ladders for the whole economy. 
17  The current ratio typically refers to assets that could be converted to cash in less than one year and to payables due within 
one year.  
18  Examples include Mexico around the time of the peso crisis, Brazil before and after 1997, Malaysia and to a lesser extent 
Indonesia and the Philippines around the time of the Asian crises of 1997-98, and Argentina. Remarkably, no such cycle is 
apparent in Korea or Thailand around 1997.  
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One possible interpretation of these fluctuations is that during boom times, banks are expanding their 
credit portfolios in anticipation of higher returns, and might be willing to offer higher rates of interest to 
longer-term depositors; this might encourage a fall in the demand deposit ratio. During bad times, the 
ratio rises because demand deposits become more attractive to depositors due to concerns about the 
safety of their deposits,
19 because banks offer lower rates of interest and because credit has fallen. 
The effect would be particularly strong in those banking systems where credit has collapsed or NPLs 
have suddenly been taken off the books of the banking system, as occurred in the Czech Republic 
earlier this decade.
20 One caveat is that in a number of cases, such as Mexico, the rise in demand 
deposits appears to have persisted for a long time, so factors other than the 1994 crisis may be 
responsible for the rise in the proportion of such deposits. 
The preceding discussion suggests that the relative importance of risks could change over the 
business cycle. Credit risk would be of concern during boom periods as credit portfolios expanded. 
Potential illiquidity in the banking system’s balance sheet, which makes it vulnerable to runs, could be 
a greater concern during bad times, but not in all cases and possibly only in the aftermath of certain 
very severe crises. Determining more precisely the changes in risks over the cycle requires further 
research. 
3.  Has the capacity to manage risks improved? 
Assessing risks 
The past 10 to 15 years have been associated with significant changes in the reliance on risk 
management in a number of emerging markets. In the past, the extension of credit in many economies 
reflected government guidelines or existing banking relationships. Institutional conditions played a 
large role; many banks were state-owned or were subject to government credit guidelines. Private 
banks (eg in East Asia) were often family-owned or formed part of a corporate network in which priority 
was given to lending within the group of related businesses. There was no culture of risk management; 
the government, other banks, or the profitable segments of the corporate networks (which were often 
relied upon to provide guarantees to their weaker partners) would provide support in case of financial 
difficulty. Supervisory oversight was formal and focused on compliance with rules rather than risk 
mitigation.
21 The system was not transparent, and market discipline was absent or ineffective. 
The high costs of this system (financial crises, persistent losses among public banks) have led to 
significant changes. State-owned banks have been privatised in many countries. Competition has 
been encouraged by liberalising entry, notably by foreign banks (see the paper by Mihaljek in this 
volume). There has been more reliance on market discipline, requiring greater transparency in 
governance and accounting. Prudential oversight has shifted towards ensuring that financial 
institutions are run in a way that is conducive to financial stability, as opposed to ensuring compliance 
with rules. 
To varying degrees, these changes have increased the accountability of bank managers and their 
incentives to improve risk management. In the past 10 years, risk management units have been 
established in banks in emerging market economies or their role has been strengthened, and risk 
management issues are now explicitly considered by boards of directors of these banks. Ongoing 
technical improvements include: (i) changes in the approach to valuation, including marking to market 
or fair value assessments; (ii) the quantification of various risks, including the use of VaR calculations 
                                                       
19  Increases in demand deposits may be seen in the context of Diamond and Rajan’s (2003) argument that such deposits 
serve as a device for attracting depositors by reassuring them that the bank will not be able to extract additional rents (any 
effort to do so would trigger a bank run). Demand deposits and the associated financial fragility are thus a disciplining device 
that are an intrinsic feature of financial intermediation. The policy implication is that financial fragility should not be entirely 
eliminated by regulation since it promotes good internal governance. 
20  As noted earlier, this effect is not apparent in Korea or Thailand, even though both countries had large programmes for NPL 
disposal. 
21  For perspectives on supervision see Topping (2005), and the respective contributions to this volume by Ryback, 
Guinigundo, Al-Hamidy and Villar. BIS Papers No 28  75
 
and stress testing, focused on market risks and to some extent on credit risks; and (iii) the pricing and 
allocation of credit, as well as provisioning and the allocation of capital on the basis of risk 
assessment. 
While the extent to which more market-oriented or sophisticated risk management tools have been 
adopted varies considerably, the use of such tools now appears to be a more common part of banking 
practice in emerging markets. As illustrated in Graph 5, which focuses on valuation, modelling and 
reliance on data, in about 40% or more of responding countries there has been full or extensive 
adoption of marking to market, VaR (typically of market risks), stress testing, and reliance on credit 
default information or credit bureaus. However, efforts to adopt better approaches to valuation and risk 
management raise a number of issues. 
Graph 5 
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Source: Central banks. 
Issues of valuation 
There has been a shift towards marking to market and fair value accounting that in many cases is 
broadly consistent with international or developed country accounting standards. Implementation 
appears to be well advanced in some emerging markets while lagging in others. For example, Korea 
and Turkey have adopted fair value on trading portfolios (derivatives and many securities), but other 
assets are measured at historical cost. Other countries are taking steps to implement international 
accounting standards for fair value accounting (eg IAS 39). 
Transparent accounting is a prerequisite for effective risk management and the exercise of market 
discipline. In addition, it creates the right incentives for bank managers. For example, a number of 
emerging markets have kept NPLs on their books for extended periods without recognising the losses. 
The implementation of IAS 39 would require banks to recognise these losses, creating a strong 
incentive to dispose of the loans (this is the case in the Philippines). Notwithstanding these 
advantages, the growing adoption of fair value accounting raises a number of issues cited by our 
questionnaire respondents.
22 
                                                       
22  One respondent also cited the amount and quality of resources and controls required to reliably measure the fair value of 
financial instruments, which is disclosed in a note to the financial statements.  
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First, measurement issues. For example, how does the designated use of a financial instrument affect 
its measurement (eg a loan which is a hedged item in a fair value hedge and a loan which is not; debt 
securities held to maturity, held for sale and trading securities; a derivative instrument which is a 
hedging instrument in a cash flow hedge and a derivative which is not). How does one deal with 
measurement differences of instruments that differ in their legal form, but are similar in their economic 
substance (for example: loans and debt securities that are not traded). 
Second, how can one obtain reasonable fair value for instruments which are not priced in deep and 
liquid markets?  
Third, how relevant are unrealised valuation changes, especially those that are not intended to be 
realised for a long while? Such valuation changes mean bank financial statements can become more 
volatile. This could raise regulatory capital requirements, and possibly lead to procyclicality. 
Views on how to address this last issue vary considerably, with some opting for deferred recognition of 
valuation changes and one central bank stressing the importance of immediate recognition. In 
Venezuela, the bank supervisory authority (which is not the central bank) has dealt with unrealised 
valuation changes by allowing banks to transfer government securities, over 90% of the investment 
portfolio, from the trading portfolio (subject to mark to market) to a “permanent portfolio”. Banks thus 
avoid the effects of a sharp decline in prices, and can easily hold government securities to maturity 
since the longest term is four years. Another respondent noted that the Committee of EU Banking 
Supervisors had introduced prudential filters which help limit the impact of IAS introduction on 
regulatory capital and presumably attenuate any procyclical impact at the macro level. However, the 
Czech National Bank stressed that financial statement volatility contains important information. It noted 
that movements in the yield curve introduce volatility into the profit and loss statement only if a bank is 
not hedging its interest rate risk; it is appropriate to show this profit and loss volatility by fair value 
accounting. Under old accounting practices, this volatility was hidden. 
Issues of risk assessment 
As noted earlier, banks in emerging markets are adopting more advanced techniques for risk 
assessment, such as VaR, stress testing and credit scoring. Underlying this have been sustained 
efforts by financial institutions in many emerging market economies to introduce functional risk 
management groups as well as the large improvements in IT infrastructure needed to handle up-to-
date valuation and risk measurement requirements. In a number of economies, risk assessment is 
now used as the basis for daily transactions, and to improve such risk management practices as limits 
to different positions. Three difficulties in implementing more sophisticated risk assessment techniques 
may be highlighted.  
First, data problems. Modern techniques of risk management, reflected in the methodological 
approach of Basel II, involve the estimation of probabilities of default on the lender’s loan portfolio, as 
well as of loss-given-default. Banks in emerging markets often lack sufficient data on corporate and 
household rates of default to estimate default probabilities.
23 In the case of one advanced emerging 
market economy, banks could estimate default probabilities but typically did not estimate loss-given-
default. Foreign banks get around the problem by relying on data from their home country operations, 
but these data might not be entirely applicable to the emerging markets. Many emerging markets are, 
however, taking steps to improve data availability. For example, Malaysia and Thailand have 
respectively established a centralised credit registry (for households and corporations) and a credit 
information bureau. However, in some countries banks are reluctant to share information on 
borrowers, even when credit information bureaus already exist.  
Second, even in relatively advanced emerging markets, banks might lack suitable techniques for 
designing and calibrating models to evaluate alternative scenarios. As noted by one central bank 
respondent, measures of VaR or market risk are sometimes not standardised, and it is difficult to verify 
the economic validity of estimated values.  
                                                       
23  It would still be possible to draw on a significant amount of information to make informed credit decisions, but tighter 
constraints on credit might then be needed due to less precisely estimated risks. One central bank respondent said that 
growing credit card lending was appropriately managed by banks which followed due diligence in lending to households. 
Such banks generally required borrowers to submit regular information about their income and debt positions. BIS Papers No 28  77
 
Third, the human resources and infrastructure (IT and other) costs of implementing advanced 
techniques of risk assessment can be very large. 
One questionnaire respondent said that external ratings also help risk management processes, as 
they can be used as a check on internal ratings or to assess credit risks. For instance, reliance on 
external ratings of borrowers is foreseen under the standardised approach of Basel II. However, 
discussions with international rating agencies suggest that it is unlikely that they will rate more than 
a limited set of (major) borrowers in each emerging market in the near future, because increasing 
coverage is simply too costly.
24 This would be particularly true in the less advanced emerging 
markets that would be most likely to rely on external ratings. There are local rating agencies in a 
number of countries that cover a larger set of domestic corporate borrowers. This can contribute to 
improved risk assessment, but the national ratings are not necessarily comparable across 
countries.
25 Each country would thus have a different way of rating borrowers and weighting risks. 
An implication is that indicators of banking conditions such as capital asset ratios will not be 
comparable across countries. This can complicate policy assessment and cross-border asset 
allocation decisions.  
Better risk management?
26 
Better risk management is ultimately reflected in better pricing. While pricing reflecting assessments 
of risks and return are the norm in developed countries, achieving this in emerging economies is an 
ongoing process. A key concern in some countries has been the existence of very high bank 
intermediation margins over extended periods (Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000)). The reasons for 
the persistence of high intermediation margins are not clear, but may include a history of banking 
crises, lack of competition, and government regulations that favour lending to certain sectors (which 
might result in cross-subsidisation through higher rates being charged to other sectors). In the past, 
restrictions in interest rates may also have played a role. 
Cross-country time series data for intermediation margins are not readily available, but IMF data on 
loan-to-deposit spreads offer some perspective (Graph 6). As can be seen, Brazil is perhaps the 
most extreme case of high spreads, at around 40%. In contrast, there are a number of countries 
where loan-to-deposit spreads are low, and comparable to those in developed markets. Even in 
those countries where spreads are lower, however, extended periods of stability raise questions 
about the influence of market forces in price setting.
27 
                                                       
24  For example, in Mexico, where there is a large foreign bank presence, rating agencies play a limited but growing role in 
assessing banks’ credit risks. On the one hand, only a few categories of assets take external ratings into consideration and 
few banks have rated their issued securities. On the other hand, the local operations of international rating agencies 
(Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) are the main source of ratings for Mexican and other Latin American companies and 
provide increasingly valuable information. Their ratings complement banks’ internal rating systems, thus improving debtor 
quality information.  
25  Domestic rating agencies often follow a methodology similar to that of international rating agencies, but would not be in a 
position to harmonise ratings on a cross-country basis. In a number of emerging markets, the problem is alleviated by 
foreign rating agencies entering into joint ventures with local ones. In China, there are 73 rating agencies with a total staff of 
1,200 and cooperation with international rating agencies has led to significant improvements in rating techniques and 
quality. 
26  Risk management has been influenced by provisioning, which is discussed in Villar’s contribution to this volume.  
27  See also the discussion of pass-through from money market rates in Archer’s contribution to this volume. An alternative 
perspective on spreads is provided by Sidaoui in his contribution to this volume (see discussion relating to his Graph 11). He 
notes that higher spreads can be obtained from new types of lending, such as credit card lending, than from traditional 
commercial credit. As noted by Pruski and Zochowski in this volume, credit to households also earns higher rates than 
credit to corporations in Poland.  
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Source: IMF. 
Questionnaire responses suggest that the adoption of improved techniques for risk assessment have 
allowed banks in some emerging markets to improve risk management and to rationalise their pricing. 
Innovation will play an increasingly important role in this process, as new financial instruments tend to 
reduce market segmentation, and to make prices across borders and between various types of 
financial instruments (credit and equity) move more closely. However, concerns remain about whether 
pricing fully reflects the risks being taken. 
A number of factors that have a bearing on pricing and risk management in emerging market 
economies may be cited. 
First, technical difficulties in pricing risk correctly. While risk is now increasingly taken into account in 
pricing, domestic banks in many emerging market economies still face considerable difficulty in pricing 
it correctly because of the data and model limitations cited earlier.  
Second, changes in market structure and growing competition. Changes in market structure 
(privatisation, increased entry by foreign banks, financial innovations) have significantly altered the 
competitive environment faced by domestic banks.
28 In emerging markets, foreign banks intensify 
competition because they tend to be more highly rated than domestic banks (whose ratings typically 
do not exceed the sovereign’s) and thus have access to cheaper financing. Their competitive 
advantages are often enhanced by greater operating efficiency and better technology. The 
implications for risk management and financial stability are mixed. On the one hand, the erosion in 
pricing power (ie less ability to lower deposit rates and raise loan rates) reduces earnings and 
increases the incentives for risk-taking on the part of domestic banks. Moreover, competitive 
pressures might also lead to mispricing. For example, in one economically advanced emerging 
market, the lending rate generally reflects expected loss, but only a few banks incorporate unexpected 
loss (cost of capital) into their pricing due to competition in the lending market.
29 On the other hand, 
lower loan rates reduce adverse selection problems and incentives for risk-taking by borrowers.
30 The 
presence of foreign banks can also enhance financial stability by improving risk management among 
competitors, and because of the potential support by the parent. Indeed, questionnaire respondents 
indicated that foreign banks often hedge their positions by implementing reverse transactions with their 
respective parents.  
                                                       
28  See the paper by Mihaljek in this volume. 
29  Improvements in measuring expected and unexpected loss are also needed in order to increase the use of risk-based 
pricing. 
30  For a discussion of these competing viewpoints and some recent empirical evidence, see Beck et al (2003) and Boyd and 
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Third, concentration risk and connected lending. In some countries (eg Israel) concentration risk arises 
because most credit is to the local economy and all the big banks are locally owned. Credit to a few 
big local groups of connected borrowers is now close to regulatory ceilings; some of these are highly 
leveraged borrowers whose performance could have systemic effects. Some of these groups were 
formed as a result of privatisation. It may be noted that connected lending as a percentage of capital is 
nonetheless relatively small in Israel, just over 5% in 2004, compared to nearly 12% in Saudi Arabia, 
20% in Venezuela and about 26% in Mexico (Annex Table A2). While precise data are not available, 
connected lending appears to be an issue in China, where banks sometimes extend credit on the 
basis of loan guarantees by related (but sometimes also unrelated) parties. Loan guarantees appear 
to have been implicated in the recent failure of a major Chinese conglomerate.
31  
The risks of connected lending are illustrated by the experience in the last decade of one emerging 
market where most private sector banks belong to family-owned industrial groups. There were limits 
on connected lending but banks still tended to lend to their related group companies, which pursued 
aggressive growth strategies. Presumably because connected lending creates incentives for 
evergreening, NPLs were rolled over and not classified according to requirements; huge loan losses 
were thus underestimated. Connected lending was also a problem during Korea’s financial crisis, as 
well rated or better performing firms provided guarantees to related weaker firms. In Turkey, efforts to 
reduce connected lending could be very beneficial as most failing banks taken over by the country’s 
saving deposit insurance fund engaged in such lending (see Başçi’s contribution to this volume). 
Fourth, government restrictions. Credit risk can be influenced by government restrictions or 
institutional factors that affect the ability of banks to manage risks. In some countries, interest rate 
controls prevent banks from pricing credit to account for risks. For example, interest rates in China and 
Venezuela are still subject to controls, although they were recently partly liberalised in China. In 
Turkey consumer loans can only be extended at fixed rates, creating risks for creditors who fund at 
floating rates. In a number of countries (eg India) banks are required to follow credit allocation 
guidelines, which do not necessarily conform to decisions based on assessments of risks and returns. 
In China, there is concern that local authorities have influenced credit decisions made by bank 
branches. 
Fifth, deficiencies in legal frameworks. An important source of credit risk is imperfect contract 
enforcement. Many banks in emerging markets - particularly those following civil law - confront 
legislation that generally favours the borrower rather than the creditor (for example, by making 
collateral difficult to seize). Apart from this, court cases can last for years and outcomes are 
unpredictable; the resulting risks deter lending. Changes have been slow, although some countries 
(eg Brazil, Mexico, Argentina) have adopted new banking legislation that has to varying degrees 
improved contract enforcement. In Brazil, ways of attaching earnings to pay bank debt have resulted in 
large increases in lending to households. In some cases, like that of Venezuela, developments have 
gone the other way; activism by consumer groups and legislative and judicial decisions have reduced 
creditor rights, and eroded the credit culture of borrowers. 
Sixth, a risk management culture is still not fully developed in many emerging markets. While risk 
management culture now resembles that of developed markets in a number of countries, there are still 
some noteworthy differences. Even when banks are privately owned, bank boards might accept 
greater risks over the objections of their risk management groups, with a view to gaining a larger 
market share or short-term increases in revenues. Under these conditions, recent easy financing 
conditions and competitive pressures could imply an excessive lowering of credit standards. Credit 
standards have also been an ongoing concern in China, and in particular the extent to which a 
reduction in NPLs might have been achieved largely by expanding the overall size of the loan books 
without adequate consideration for risks.
32 Even if the importance of effective risk management has 
                                                       
31  Press reports indicate that the failed industrial conglomerate Kelon received CNY 381 million in guarantees from 
Greencool enterprises, a firm owned by Kelon’s former Chairman Gu. Resources became available to make good on this 
guarantee only because Mr Gu’s assets were seized. Non-transparent loan guarantees appear to have posed other 
difficulties for Kelon. As early as 2002, it had advanced CNY 1.2 billion to its former controlling shareholder through 
undisclosed transactions involving bank borrowings, guarantees and debt transfers. More recently, a local Chinese court 
froze CNY 17.1 million in bank deposits and Kelon’s 22.73% stake in its Jiangxi-based subsidiary Huayi Compressor Co 
Ltd due to a loan guarantee dispute. 
32  For example, according to press reports, a Goldman Sachs report on China Construction Bank, which was listed in Hong 
Kong SAR in October 2005, estimated that 7.4% of new corporate loans granted by CCB in 2002 had already turned sour. 
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been recognised by the Chinese authorities for some time now, observers have expressed concern 
that majority government ownership might create incentives to pursue social as opposed to 
commercial goals, with such an approach leading to bank losses.  
In some cases, prudential regulations suggest concerns that risk management tools in place might not 
suffice to manage systemic risks. One example is regulatory loan-to-value ceilings, implemented in 
some emerging markets, which do not rely on the internal risk management tools of financial 
institutions. Another example is restrictions that were recently imposed on consumer credit in 
Thailand.
33 Beyond this, government intervention to rescue financial institutions or firms can dampen 
incentives for risk management, particularly if these institutions do not pose systemic risks.  
Seventh, the adequacy of mechanisms and markets for managing and mitigating risks. This involves 
issues such as the availability of instruments for hedging and risk transfer, and the functioning of the 
interbank market (for managing liquidity risks). These are discussed in the next two sections. 
Instruments for hedging and transferring risks 
The effectiveness of risk management also depends on the ability to hedge or transfer risks. One 
issue here is the lack of depth in (cash) asset markets, which has sometimes constrained risk 
management by limiting the ability of financial institutions to adjust their portfolios in a timely fashion. 
Conditions in some cases have improved, however (see below). 
Another issue is the depth of markets for hedging or transferring risks. The degree of market 
development varies, but in a number of cases derivatives markets have grown rapidly. For example, 
increases in outstanding derivatives positions have been large in Mexico and Hungary. Based on 
questionnaire responses, the following can be highlighted (see Annex Table A6).  
First, markets for hedging exchange rate risk (forwards, swaps) are common in emerging economies 
and are usually the most liquid. 
Second, markets for hedging interest rate risk are either very recent or not available in a number of 
emerging market economies (eg in Latin America). One reason for this may be lack of liquidity in 
underlying bond markets.
34 Countries have sought to address this with varying degrees of success. 
One successful example is offered by Mexico, where maturities have increased considerably, and 
local currency fixed rate government issues are now available in maturities of three, five, seven, 
10  and 20 years. These securities have helped stabilise cash flows under different interest rate 
conditions, and instruments exist to hedge the associated interest rate risk in fairly liquid markets.  
Third, standardised contracts that trade on exchanges (eg futures) are available in some countries. 
Such contracts are sometimes preferred because they lower costs. They are also more transparent, 
thus lowering the operational (eg settlement) risk usually associated with over-the-counter 
(OTC)transactions. However, because they are not customised, they will not necessarily be the first 
choice of financial institutions seeking to develop new products. 
Fourth, the share of new credit risk transfer instruments is still small in many emerging markets 
although these instruments are attracting growing interest. One of their uses has been to help 
strengthen banking systems via the securitisation of NPLs. More recently, there has been interest in 
the development of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets. However, questionnaire responses 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Furthermore, “special mention” loans (which were likely to become NPLs) comprised 14% of CCB’s loan book in the first 
half of 2005. The case of CCB is particularly relevant because of government measures to strengthen the bank by 
recapitalising it, removing NPLs from its books, and improving its governance prior to listing. For another example, in the 
course of a(n individual) rating upgrade in September 2005, Fitch Ratings estimated that ICBC’s NPLs had fallen due to 
government assistance, but the underlying trend of ICBC NPLs actually increased in 2004. ICBC states that this is due to a 
much stricter classification of overdue loans. 
33  According to the Bank of Thailand, this recent regulation of consumer credit was partly preventive, with a view to reducing 
systemic risks, and not aimed at restricting credit to households. The current regulation restricts the maximum credit limit to 
five times borrowers’ monthly income, 10% minimum payments, and cancellation of credit cards with outstanding debt 
exceeding three months. To prevent what were seen as excessively high interest rate charges, interest rates on consumer 
lending are now subject to a maximum of 28% (15% interest rate and 13% charges and fees). 
34  See Jiang and McCauley (2004), Ma and Remolona (2005), Gyntelberg et al (2005), Jeanneau and Peréz Verdia (2005) 
and BIS (2002). BIS Papers No 28  81
 
suggested that while traditional derivative instruments are widely used for risk mitigation, new credit 
risk transfer instruments, such as credit default swaps or asset-backed securities (ABSs), are 
sometimes used to take certain investment positions at a lower cost, or to provide services to clients, 
rather than to manage risks. To illustrate, in some countries foreign banks issue credit-linked notes 
acquired by domestic residents (typically banks); the reference is dollar-denominated debt issued by 
the host country. In this manner, foreign banks buy protection from domestic residents, paid for in 
advance. The credit-linked notes are an investment vehicle for domestic banks that thereby become 
exposed to counterparty and credit risk.
35 Another example is the use of cross-border ABSs 
denominated in foreign currency to finance the issuance of credit cards in Korea. Here, ABSs provided 
a way of accessing domestic and foreign financing on much cheaper terms than could have been 
obtained by issuing a bond in the domestic market. To illustrate how Korean ABS transactions were 
designed, Annex 1 discusses an ABS transaction securitising the credit card receivables of a major 
credit card company, LG Card.  
New credit risk transfer instruments raise a number of issues. First, how can the reallocation of risks 
associated with new instruments be systematically assessed and managed? In particular, does the 
possibility that these instruments could transfer risks towards emerging markets rather than away from 
them raise concerns? For example, while it could appear in Korea’s case that risk was transferred to 
foreign investors buying the ABS notes it is not clear how much cross-border risk-sharing actually 
occurred as Korea’s credit crisis unfolded. If foreign investors suffered any losses, these were not as 
widely reported as the considerable losses to Korean financial institutions. One could also ask whether 
prudential issues arise when financial institutions in emerging market economies become protection 
sellers through credit derivative instruments. These transactions increase domestic bank exposure to 
the sovereign and introduce a layer of counterparty risk. 
Second, does the design of some credit risk transfer instruments, and the insurance provided to 
investors, weaken rather than reinforce market discipline? In particular, does it reduce the incentive for 
diligent risk management by protection buyers or the issuer?  
Third, is the process (which might involve several parties engaged in a complex web of transactions) 
sufficiently transparent?  
Interbank markets 
Banks’ capacity to manage risks depends in part on how well the interbank market works. A particular 
concern is how vulnerable banking systems are to shocks that might reduce liquidity in the interbank 
market, as this could be an important channel for the spread of a crisis. In particular, in response to a 
shock (such as the failure of a major bank) banks might choose to withdraw liquidity from the interbank 
market, triggering contagion.
36 One questionnaire respondent noted that liquidity risk had risen with an 
increase in (bank) lending and household deposits. While risk was contained by a recently established 
deposit insurance system, stress testing suggested that banks could incur significant losses as a result 
of a crisis in the interbank lending market. 
Some perspective can be gained by reviewing the relative importance of interbank markets, and 
pressures on liquidity indicated by the volatility of interbank rates. To illustrate, Graph 7 (left-hand 
panel) provides an indicator of the relative size of interbank credit for a number of emerging market 
economies. As can be seen, there is a significant amount of cross-country variation, with Russia 
having the smallest relative interbank claims (by this measure) and Thailand the highest.  
                                                       
35  However, the risk rating of the counterparty might be higher than the sovereign’s. Credit-linked notes are used inter alia in 
the Philippines and Venezuela. 
36  Systematic research on this topic has so far focused on the experience of some developed countries. For example, Furfine 
(1999) estimates bilateral exposures in the US federal funds market and attempts to determine the impact of a major bank 
failure on other banks (“domino effects”). Losses appear to be limited. Upper and Worms (2002) estimate domino effects in 
Germany, and find that there is a high degree of concentration in the interbank market; in line with this, domino effects can 
lead to significant losses from contagion. Gatev et al (2004) argue that liquidity in the interbank market might increase 
during periods of financial stress because investors shift funds from capital markets to their banks. Liquidity pooling effects 
(see reference to Kashyap et al (2002) in footnote 15) become particularly important during episodes of financial stress 
because the correlation between liquidity demands by depositors and borrowers becomes negative.  
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1  End of period.   
2  Measured as deposit money banks’ claims on other financial institutions as a percentage of claims on 
private sector and on other financial institutions. 
Sources: IMF; Datastream. 
Interbank exposures might not fully coincide with activity in the short-term interbank market (eg they 
might reflect longer-term financing by development banks). To the extent that they do, however, the 
graph provides an approximation of differences in banks’ reliance on the interbank market for 
liquidity.
37 A small share of interbank claims might mean that banks find it too risky to extend credit to 
each other due to imperfect information,
38 deficiencies in payment systems or other unfavourable 
institutional arrangements. For example, depending on the financing instruments available, it might be 
relatively difficult to close a position, or secure immediate delivery of a security against payment. In 
some cases, high reserve or liquid asset requirements could discourage interbank market activity by 
limiting the availability of excess reserves (required liquid asset ratios are 25% (of deposits) in Hong 
Kong SAR and India and 20% in Saudi Arabia).
39 These various impediments to the liquidity of 
interbank markets could lower the resilience of the banking system in the face of liquidity shocks 
unless monetary authorities took offsetting measures. 
The low interest rates and ample liquidity prevailing in recent years have alleviated concerns about the 
availability of funding in interbank markets. However, even under such conditions, significant shocks to 
liquidity in the interbank market are possible, particularly as monetary policy tightens or as a result of 
other policy actions.
40 For example, recent press commentary has noted the very high volatility in 
interbank rates in Russia (Graph 7, right-hand panel), which could be related to concerns about how 
recent closures of poorly performing banks would affect liquidity. When China raised reserve 
requirements in 2003 in order to dampen money creation, banks anticipated further increases, causing 
liquidity in the interbank market to fall and the interbank interest rate to rise. 
                                                       
37  The availability of alternatives to interbank lending might also play a role. For example, when opportunities for extending 
credit to the private sector are strong the share of interbank lending might fall. This does not appear to be an important 
factor in Brazil or Russia, where the ratio is relatively stable, but the relationship might be more apparent if a broader 
measure of bank assets were used. 
38  In a Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) framework, loan supply is backward bending. If information problems are sufficiently severe, 
there might be no equilibrium interest rate at which the market clears and no credit would then be supplied in the interbank 
market. 
39  On the other hand, liquidity requirements reduce the scope for excessive risk-taking. Other factors that might affect relative 
size are extensive dollarisation, which might limit the demand for liquidity in domestic currency, and efficiency; eg the share 
of interbank claims in the United States (about 3%) would tend to be lower than in some emerging markets because liquidity 
management technology allows less reliance on interbank financing. 
40  A recent study on operating procedure found that unexpected government transactions with the central bank are an 
important source of shocks to liquidity in emerging interbank markets (Hawkins (2005)), whereas in more developed 
economies the central bank receives advance notice from the government and can take offsetting actions. BIS Papers No 28  83
 
Two implications of imperfectly functioning interbank markets can be cited. First, banks might prefer 
not to implement transactions with each other but rather to do so with the central bank. Central banks 
should be aware that this can impair the development of effective liquidity management and of 
financial markets. Second, shocks can have significant distribution effects. When interest rates rise in 
some emerging interbank markets (eg Hong Kong SAR, Russia, Thailand), smaller banks might suffer 
from reduced liquidity while larger banks might profit, because the former are usually borrowers and 
the latter lenders in these markets. This has mixed implications for resource allocation and systemic 
stability.
41  
Central banks have taken a number of steps to enhance liquidity in interbank and securities markets. 
For example, the Central Bank of Malaysia announced in early 2005 that it would use repos in the 
interbank market, thus encouraging their use to manage liquidity and reducing reliance on direct 
lending or the issuance of short-term bills. Liquidity is to be enhanced further through improved 
securities custodianship arrangements and the introduction of a securities lending facility to improve 
market-making.
42 Improvements in custodianship have recently also been implemented in the 
Philippines. Another measure to enhance liquidity has been to reduce high liquidity and cash ratios. 
For example, while liquidity ratios (requiring banks to hold, inter alia, government securities) were not 
binding in India for extended periods, they could become so with rising interest rates. Revisions to 
existing legislation were introduced in July 2005 to give the Reserve Bank of India leeway to adjust 
them as needed.
43 
4.  Conclusion: has the health of the banking systems in emerging market 
economies improved? 
The ability of banking systems to bear risks in the future will be determined in part by their financial 
health, current versus prospective. This can be assessed by examining information from bank financial 
statements (ie financial soundness indicators); by looking at stock market indicators; by relying on 
credit ratings of banks; or by reviewing composite indicators of bank vulnerability. In general, these 
current indicators suggest improvements in banking health, but as noted below, they must be 
interpreted with caution. 
Financial soundness and market indicators 
The favourable economic conditions observed in recent years have been associated with significant 
improvements in indicators of banking performance: ROA and capital asset ratios have generally 
                                                       
41  See earlier discussion referring to Beck et al (2003) and Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) in footnote 30 on how the presence of 
large banks can increase the incentive to manage risks effectively but possibly select for riskier borrowers or projects. Thus, 
a shock that favours large banks could improve or worsen systemic stability. Resource allocation could worsen in either 
case if there are no substitutes for smaller banks which provide credit to underserved economic sectors. Relationships in the 
interbank market are also relevant, and have been studied by Cocco et al (2004). Using data from the Portuguese interbank 
market they find that: (i) borrowers with lower returns on assets (ROAs) and a higher proportion of NPLs are more likely to 
rely on relationship lending, illustrating the default risk and monitoring function of the latter; (ii) borrowers with more volatile 
liquidity shocks are more likely to rely on relationship lending with lenders who have less volatile liquidity shocks and also 
with whom they have less correlated shocks; (iii) borrowers are more likely to rely on lending relationships when they 
experience a larger imbalance in their reserve deposits (lending relationships as insurance); (iv) small borrowers are more 
likely to establish relationships and tend to choose larger banks as their preferred lenders (in line with the broader literature 
on relationship lending). As for pricing, the authors find that other things equal, larger banks borrow and lend at more 
favourable terms, while banks with higher ROAs lend at higher interest rates (higher opportunity costs). They also find that 
borrowers with higher NPLs tend to pay higher interest rates, and banks with better investment opportunities tend to be net 
borrowers. 
42  For further details on recent initiatives to develop financial markets see, for example, Zamani’s and Sidaoui’s respective 
contributions to this volume. 
43  In India, bank investments in government securities (under the Statutory Liquidity Ratio) fell to 36.3% of demand and time 
liabilities (still above the statutory requirement) at 8 July 2005 from 42.3% a year earlier.  
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risen, and NPLs have declined.
44 Recent stock price behaviour suggests that market sentiment 
towards banks in emerging markets has improved. In Asia, CEE and Latin America (excluding 
Argentina) bank stock prices have risen relative to overall stock prices in recent years (although more 
recently they have tended to decline: Graph 8, lower right-hand panel). This has occurred even in 
some markets where overall stock prices have risen significantly. In Turkey, for example, in the period 
between June 2003 and November 2005, a bank stock index rose 452% while the overall market 
index rose about 218%.
45 A similar, although somewhat less dramatic pattern has been apparent in 
India. 
Graph 8 
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1    Weighted average of the economies listed based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates.     
2    Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.   
3  Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.   
4  As a 
percentage of risk-weighted assets.     
5    The Czech Republic, Poland, South Africa and Turkey. 
6 As a percentage of total 
loans.   
7  Relative to overall stock indices, 1995-2004 = 100. 
Sources: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report; CEIC; Datastream; Fitch Ratings; national data. 
However, some of the preceding indicators need to be interpreted with caution. First, financial markets 
are often not liquid, and information problems can be particularly severe. Stock prices (or other 
instruments, such as subordinated debt) might not be fully representative of market forces, nor provide 
                                                       
44  Trends in banking sector performance in the Philippines and Thailand are respectively discussed in the papers by 
Guinigundo and Bank of Thailand in this volume. 
45  This reflected the banking sector’s recovery from crisis. However, as discussed later on, ratings suggest that the banking 
sector is weaker than in the past. BIS Papers No 28  85
 
a good guide to the underlying value of a firm (ie the expected stream of future earnings, adjusted for 
risk) but instead reflect the actions of a few investors or bandwagon effects. 
Second, listed banks may not be representative of the banking system. In China, for example, the 
state commercial banks are not listed on the domestic stock market (for this reason, this index is not 
shown). In Mexico, foreign banks now control about 80% of the banking system, and as a result many 
local banks have delisted from the local stock market. Market indices thus exclude the major banks in 
the financial system in these two countries: Chinese (A shares) and Mexican banks recently 
accounted for about 7% and 4% of total market capitalisation respectively. This is well below the 15% 
share of Korean banks and the 19% share of South African banks. 
Third, indicators based on financial statements (capital adequacy ratios) can be misleading because 
some emerging market economies do not follow international accounting standards and accounts are 
not properly audited. Supervision and regulation can also affect the usefulness of financial statements. 
In line with the preceding, Rojas-Suarez (2001) shows that the traditional measures of banking health 
most commonly used in industrial countries, such as the capital/asset ratio, have performed poorly as 
indicators of banking problems in Latin America and East Asia. A key issue is that, in the absence of 
adequately functioning markets for equity (or subordinated debt), banks will not be subject to effective 
market discipline. Rojas-Suarez proposes alternative measures of banking health, such as the implicit 
interest rate paid on deposits, the spread between lending and deposit rates, the rate of loan growth 
and the growth of interbank debt. She finds that the first two are especially effective as early warning 
indicators of banking problems in emerging market economies. 
Bank ratings 
One difficulty with the preceding indicators is that it is not clear to what extent current measures of 
“good health” would survive a cyclical downturn. Perspective on this issue can be gained by examining 
the behaviour of bank ratings. Annex Table A7 shows long-term foreign currency (LTFC) and 
aggregate individual bank ratings (IR) by Fitch Ratings. LTFC ratings assess the capacity of banks to 
meet foreign currency commitments such as interest, preferred dividends or repayment of principal on 
a timely basis. Because these ratings reflect the possibility of government support they are often 
adjusted in response to changes in sovereign ratings. In contrast, individual bank ratings strip out 
support and more closely reflect a bank’s underlying financial strength.
46  
The table reveals that both LTFC and individual ratings have improved significantly in a number of 
emerging market economies between 1999 and 2004. However, there are some notable exceptions, 
such as Argentina, Venezuela and Turkey, which experienced crises over this period. Ratings remain 
low overall, with LTFC ratings of 52 (BB) or lower, in several countries.
47 Broadly in line with the 
perception that long-run growth prospects in Asia and CEE are relatively favourable, LTFC ratings in 
these areas tend to be higher than in Latin America (an important exception is Chile). 
While LTFC ratings cannot be directly compared to individual ratings, the latter still convey a greater 
impression of weakness than the former. In particular, most individual bank ratings are lower relative 
to their maximum possible rating than are LTFC ratings. The discrepancies between LTFC and 
individual ratings are apparent in the cases of China, India, Korea, Philippines, Venezuela, Poland and 
Turkey. Thus, the credit risk of bank debt has fallen in emerging markets, but this is in large measure 
due to expectations regarding external (to the bank) support. 
                                                       
46  See Fitch Ratings (2004b). According to Fitch, individual ratings are only assigned to banks. These ratings, which are 
internationally comparable, attempt to assess how a bank would be viewed if it were entirely independent and could not rely 
on external support. They are designed to assess a bank’s exposure to, appetite for, and management of risk, and thus 
represent Fitch’s view on the likelihood of it running into difficulties such that it would require support. The principal factors 
Fitch analyses to evaluate the bank and determine these ratings include profitability and balance sheet integrity (including 
capitalisation), franchise, management, operating environment, and prospects. Finally, consistency is an important 
consideration, as is a bank’s size (in terms of equity capital) and diversification (in terms of involvement in a variety of 
activities in different economic and geographical sectors). Individual ratings range from “A” to “E”. In addition, gradations 
may be used among the five ratings: ie A/B, B/C, C/D and D/E. 
47  As can be seen, however, in a number of the economies listed the LTFC ratings do exceed this threshold. As a caveat it 
may be noted that the number of banks included in each country can vary considerably.  
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Banking vulnerability 
BIS researchers have sought to derive composite indicators of banking vulnerability. Graph 9 
illustrates the readings from the index developed by Hawkins and Klau (2000).
48 As can be seen, there 
has been a significant decline in indicators of banking vulnerability in all regions since the late 1990s. 
The results are broadly consistent with a set of macroprudential indicators also developed at the BIS 
and applied by Fitch Ratings (not shown) which indicates that there are few cases of large aggregate 
credit sector imbalances in emerging market economies at this time.
49  
Graph 9 
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Note: Increases in the index (expressed as a weighted average, based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates of the 
economies in each group) imply an increase in risk. The index ranges from 0 to 10 (maximum risk). 
1  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.   
2  China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Singapore and Taiwan 
(China).   
3  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.   
4  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia and Turkey. 
Source: Hawkins and Klau (2000). 
To conclude, we have reviewed changing macroeconomic risks, new forms of risks faced by banks, 
risk management capacity and banking health. This review has been based on central bank 
responses to a questionnaire as well as statistical indicators of macroeconomic and financial 
conditions. It is apparent that there have been significant improvements in the ability of banking 
systems in emerging markets to deal with shocks and manage risks in the current cycle. Some 
changes - both macroeconomic and in risk management capability - appear to be structural and will 
apparently persist through the cycle. At the same time, however, significant weaknesses in emerging 
market banking systems still need to be overcome. 
                                                       
48  The index is based on increases in the ratio of domestic credit (to the private sector) to GDP; increases, in per cent, in the 
liabilities to BIS reporting banks; liabilities to BIS reporting banks (vis-à-vis the banking sector) as a percentage of domestic 
credit to the private sector; the three-month interest rate less the annualised change, in per cent, in consumer prices over 
the previous six months; and the average credit rating of banks. 
49  Fitch Ratings (2005), using the methodology of Borio and Lowe (2002). BIS Papers No 28  87
 
Annex 1:  
Implications of cross-border ABS transactions backed  
by credit card receivables: the example of LG Card
50 
A large proportion of the credit card business in Korea has been financed by the issuance of ABSs 
backed by credit card receivables. To illustrate, at the end of 2002, LG Card, then the largest credit 
card company in Korea, relied on ABSs for a significant proportion of its total financing. According to 
Fitch (2003) the large Korean commercial banks held significant amounts of ABSs linked to LG Card. 
Commercial banks and other domestic and foreign investors participated in financing the outstanding 
ABSs. 
An example of the structure of this type of financing is provided by a cross-border ABS transaction 
executed by LG Card. This involved the creation of a special purpose entity, Credipia 2001, a 
company organised under Korean law (“Korean (Issuer)” in the graph) solely for the purpose of issuing 
USD 500 million in floating rate guaranteed notes. While the structure of this ABS transaction shares 
many features with other such operations, an interesting characteristic was that the transaction was 
registered with the Financial Supervisory Commission in order to benefit from protection offered by 
local legislation (the Act on Asset Backed Securitisation). 
In this context the following questions are of interest. First, what were the advantages of the 
transaction? Second, how did its design allocate risks? Third, who absorbed the losses? Fourth, what 
issues does this episode raise?  
Advantages of the transaction. For investors, the transaction provided an opportunity to diversify 
investments by offering an investment grade asset. For LG Card, the cost of financing was apparently 
much lower, as reflected in the wide spread between the interest rate paid by credit card holders 
(17-23%) and the favourable yield on the ABS note (corresponding to the Aaa Moody’s rating). These 
advantages presumably account for the large share of credit card business funded by ABSs, as noted 
above. 
Allocation of risks. The institutional arrangements illustrated in the graph were designed to ensure 
payments even in the event of default by credit card holders or LG Card. The risk faced by investors 
was mitigated by a protection seller, FSA (“Guarantor”, in the graph), a New Jersey-based firm. FSA 
guaranteed full and timely payments on interest and payment on the principal on the note at par by the 
final maturity date, and also guaranteed payment on the swap. A supplementary guarantee was also 
offered by Credipia 2001 (Jersey) limited, which provided security protection for note holders because 
Korean law forbids a direct security interest in the issuer’s assets by anonymous note holders. Risks 
faced by the investor were further mitigated by the structure and credit enhancement features of the 
transaction, which gave the note holders in this transaction preferential treatment in the allocation of 
credit card receivables:  
•  The note was secured by collateral; this was the pool of credit card receivables backing the 
investor interest issued by a trust (the trustee was Kookmin Bank).  
•  Investors received credit support in the form of 15% subordination by the subordinated seller 
interest (LG Card).
51  
•  There were rapid accumulation triggers in case the portfolio deteriorated. In normal times, 
principal payments were to be deferred for four and a half years (“revolving” period in which 
only interest payments were made on the investor interest and fees were paid). Payments 
would then accumulate for six months to cover principal (“controlled accumulation period”). 
However, if the servicer or originator defaulted, a period of rapid accumulation would be 
triggered. Principal collections would instead be used to pay down the investor interest held 
by the issuer.  
                                                       
50  A macroeconomic overview of Korea’s credit card crisis and associated macroeconomic effects is provided in a box in 
Mohanty et al’s contribution to this volume. Discussion of the structure of the ABS transaction is based on Moody’s (2001). 
51  For a discussion of subordination in ABS transactions see Isaka et al (2005).   
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•  Risks were further controlled by the structure and by adjusting the location of principal 
collection payments. Thus, the claim on the credit card loan pool was transferred by LG Card 
to the special purpose entity. Also, the type of triggers determined where principal collections 
would accumulate; at the trust level if portfolio performance deteriorated, at the issuer level if 
LG Card itself breached triggers. 
Who absorbed the losses? Once the crisis unfolded and LG Card was unable to service its debts, 
costs were absorbed by its major creditors, who agreed to swap existing loans into equity followed by 
a capital reduction that would lead to recognition of losses; and by banks (both commercial and 
policy), which injected new capital into the company. The result was that almost all LG Card ownership 
switched to its major creditors, with government-owned Korea Development Bank acquiring a 25% 
ownership share. It is less clear to what extent other domestic or foreign investors absorbed any 
losses. However, it is noteworthy that after a period in which no ABSs were issued, the market 
appears to have revived in 2005. Losses have not been reported by the New Jersey-based protection 
seller, FSA. In its 2003 Annual Report, FSA stated that it had discontinued offering guarantees in 
Korea, but that its outstanding transactions were performing and that it expected opportunities in the 
Korean market in the future. Korea was not mentioned in FSA’s 2004 Annual Report. 
Issues raised. Three issues may be highlighted. First, the extent to which the ABS structure is 
conducive to market discipline. It is apparent that the ABS structure was a very effective device for 
obtaining financing for activities that proved to be very risky after the fact. Second, transparency. 
Given the complexity of the transactions and the number of participants involved, it is difficult to tell 
whether pricing fully accounted for risk exposures, and the incentives for effective risk management. 
Also, at least one rating agency reported in early 2004 that it could not quantify ABS losses because 
details on those holdings were not available on a consistent basis (Fitch Ratings (2004)).Third, what 
prudential arrangements could be introduced to reinforce market discipline and help prevent crises.  
 






Standard deviation of annual changes, in per cent  
Real GDP  Consumer prices  Real effective 
exchange rate 
Bank credit to the 





1995-99 2000-04 1995-99 2000-04 1995-99 2000-04 1995-99 2000-04 
Latin America          
 Argentina  5.1  8.6  1.7  11.4 5.8  25.9 4.7  12.1 
 Brazil  1.7  1.9  26.5  3.5 17.5  9.1 16.2  1.8 
 Chile  4.4  1.4  1.9  1.1 5.3 6.1 1.9 2.3 
 Colombia  3.6  1.2  4.1 1.3 8.4 8.5  10.9 5.6 
 Mexico    5.2  2.8  9.5  2.1 19.6  8.1 26.7 11.7 
 Peru  3.9  1.9  3.2  1.5 7.4 4.2  10.5 2.5 
 Venezuela  4.7  10.8  29.2  7.1 18.5 13.7 27.3 20.0 
Asia, large           
 China  1.4  0.9  7.7  1.7 6.5 4.4 4.6 5.5 
 India  1.1  1.6  3.2  0.2 4.8 3.2 4.9 7.5 
 Korea  6.8  2.3  2.4  0.7 14.2  5.3  4.8  5.9 
 Taiwan,  China  0.9  3.3  1.5 0.9 3.7 4.4 1.9 6.1 
Other Asia           
 Indonesia  8.8  0.5  21.9 3.5  34.0  11.1  31.6 9.8 
 Malaysia  7.2  3.2  1.1 0.3 9.8 4.7 9.9 5.9 
 Philippines  2.6  1.5  1.5 1.6 9.7 3.7  21.0 2.8 
 Thailand  7.7  1.8  2.9  0.7 8.5 2.9  13.5 6.3 
Central Europe           
 Czech  Republic  3.1  1.1  3.3 1.8 4.9 5.3 5.4  12.1 
 Hungary  1.7  0.9  7.2  2.3 3.6 4.6 9.5 7.2 
 Poland  1.2  1.9  7.9  3.7 4.5 9.4 8.3 4.3 
Russia 4.8  2.1  73.9  4.6 28.2  6.8 32.2  9.1 
Israel 1.7  3.6  2.8  2.4 4.3 6.2 2.6 6.0 
Turkey 4.9  6.8  11.1  19.3 3.0  12.0  15.6  22.4 
South Africa  1.4  0.6  1.4 2.8 5.8  18.9 3.1 7.3 
Memo:           
United States  0.8  1.4  0.6  0.7 4.5 5.2 1.5 2.2 
Euro area  0.5  1.2  0.6  0.1 4.9 8.2 2.3 1.4 
Japan 1.8  1.3  0.8  0.4 10.4  6.5  2.9  1.1 
Canada 1.5  1.4  0.4  0.4 2.1 5.2 5.5 2.4 
New Zealand  1.5  1.2  0.6  1.2 1.9 5.1 5.5 4.9 
Norway 2.0  0.9  0.5  0.4 8.0 9.9 1.7 1.9 
1  Based on annual data.   
2 For China, credit to sectors other than central government and non-bank financial institutions. 
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS.  
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Table A2 
Credit exposures, deposit-taking institutions 
Residential real 
estate loans as a 
percentage of total 
loans 
Commercial real 
estate loans as a 
percentage of total 
loans 
Large exposures 




as a percentage of 
capital 
 
1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 
Argentina           159  93      5.7  1.4 
Chile  12.4  16.7  20.2        13.9  14.3  13.0 
Colombia  23.1  32.5  12.0             
Mexico  13.7  13.4  7.4          42.9  25.7 
Venezuela          10.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Hong  Kong  SAR    18.9  24.8   4.5  4.5          
India                   
Indonesia   4.2  5.4    0.1 0.1      101      47 
1 8.8 
Korea     24.1     21.1    175 38.1       
Malaysia    15.8  25.9   11.0  8.7          
Thailand                   
Czech  Republic                   
Hungary    2.4  19.2   1.6  3.6          
Poland    7.0  18.1     3.2          
Israel   18.4  18.7    10.6 10.2    253  137      5.3 
Saudi  Arabia          125  124  96  0.0  10.3  11.8 
T u r k e y                  
1  Refers to 2000. 
Source: Central banks. 
 
Table A3 
Banks’ holdings of securities
1 
Money market 
securities  Bonds Equities  Other   
1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 
Argentina   0.12 0.07   0.10 0.10   0.05 0.02       
Chile    17.1  17.0   0.7  7.2         
Colombia  1.9 2.3 1.6 4.6 4.5  17.0 1.2 0.2 0.9 0.6  3.5  4.4 
Mexico 82.1  83.3  95.8       17.9 16.7  4.2       
Venezuela 34.4  12.5  29.9          5.0  4.3  18.0 
Hong Kong SAR             0.2 0.3 0.6  5.9 8.6  18.6 
I n d i a                 
Indonesia   0.1  0.8    20.9 24.7    0.0  0.2    6.2   
Korea   1.6 0.6 8.8  18.8  18.0 3.6 3.4 2.6       
M a l a y s i a                 
Thailand                
Czech Republic      0.3     43.9    0.9     54.9 
Hungary   2.5  2.2    14.6  12.8   3.2  2.3      
Poland   6.7  5.1    16.5  15.8   0.4  0.2    0.0  0.0 
Israel 57.9  64.1  66.5  11.6  13.2  16.1 5.1 5.1 5.4  0.9 1.3  2.6 
Saudi  Arabia                
Turkey 0.7  0.9  1.3  9.7  14.3  30.7 0.3 1.4 0.3  1.9 1.4  0.8 
1  As a percentage of total assets. 
Source: Central banks. 
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Table A4  
Equity and exchange rate risks 
Net open position in equities as a 
percentage of capital 
Net open position in foreign exchange 
as a percentage of capital 
 
1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 
Argentina     0.47   0.18      68    57 
Chile         0.0 
Colombia        –5.4    –3.2 
Mexico      21.0   2.7     5.1   6.1 
Venezuela        
Hong Kong SAR        0.8       
India        
Indonesia         7.4 
Korea       3.3    5.6 
Malaysia        2.3    3.0 
Thailand        
Czech  Republic     41.9   20.5       
Hungary        6.1    27.0 
Poland      0.3     –1.6    1.5 
Israel     6.5    12.8     0.9   0.4 
Saudi  Arabia        
Turkey        –64.9    –0.4 










1 in per 
cent 
Liquid assets as a 
percentage of total 
assets 




1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 
Argentina    96  120      6  15    34  50 
Chile             24.4  22.9 21.5 28.0 26.7 25.4 
Colombia  106  104  135     9.0  12.6  29.3  252  240  661 
Mexico  94  210  175        28.0    37.0 
Venezuela  266  172  208     21.6 24.8  18.4  84.4 32.8 23.4 
Hong Kong SAR    116  179  25.0  25.0 25.0    21.4 28.0   54.1  52.3 
India   190  172          41.9  42.7       
Indonesia 86  177  172         19.6  23.5    19.2  32.9 
Korea  97  96  88   100 100   51.4  39.5   133 115 
Malaysia
2 98  120  122  17      9      18     
Thailand                
Czech  Republic   153 161         19.5  32.8   104  95.0 
Hungary   162  92          37.5  21.9    74.1  45.9 
Poland   139  136          18.2  26.1    37.8  53.1 
Israel 125  123  121        13.6 40.2  29.4  17.5 38.7 28.2 
Saudi Arabia        20.0  20.0  20.0 0.0 32.1  27.5 0.0 53.3 42.5 
Turkey  115  155  124     32.6 34.0  41.6  59.0 49.0 65.0 
1  Defined as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets except for Korea (defined as liquid assets to liquid liabilities).   
2  Data 
shown refer to commercial banks. 
























Annex Table A6 
Hedging or credit risk transfer instruments 
  Exchange rate/ 
interest rate risk  Exchange-traded  New financial 
instruments 
Government-supplied 
instruments  Notes 
Hong Kong SAR  Y/Y  Y  Y  N   
India Y/Y    Collateralised  borrowing 
and lending obligation (a 
money market 
instrument to mitigate 
risk). 
Y  Plain vanilla FRAs/IRS 
allowed, no 
caps/collars/floors. 
Indonesia      N N Limited  number  of 
hedging instruments and 
limited liquidity. 
Korea  Y/Y  Y  MBS market based on 
medium- and long-term 
mortgage loans has 
expanded recently. 
No. Government 
promotes market. The 
March 2004 
establishment of KHFC, 
which takes over and 
securitises medium-term 
mortgage loans from 
financial institutions, 
stimulated the MBS 
market. 
Forwards, futures, 
swaps and options 
markets exist. 
Malaysia  Y/Y  Y  Small but growing fast. 
Some ABSs backed by 
credit card receivables. 
Residential MBSs (also 
Islamic). 
Derivatives still in 
infancy in Malaysia but 
growing rapidly. 
Philippines     Credit-linked  notes 
issued by foreign banks 
backed by government 
debt issued in foreign 
currency. 
























Annex Table A6 (cont) 
Hedging or credit risk transfer instruments 
  Exchange rate/ 
interest rate risk  Exchange-traded  New financial 
instruments 
Government-supplied 
instruments  Notes 
Singapore Y/Y  Y  CDSs,  credit-linked 
notes, CDOs, CDO 
squared, first to default, 
nth to default, index-
based trades used to 
manage credit spread 
risk. 
N  
Thailand  Y/Y  Y  Some interest in credit 
derivatives, CDOs, 
structured notes. 
  Except for credit 
derivatives, new 
instruments used to 
provide service to clients 
and enhance yields, not 
for managing or 
transferring own risk. 
Chile  Y/Y  Y    No. The Central Bank of 
Chile, independent from 
the government, can 
enter into currency swap 
contracts with banks for 
purposes of monetary 
regulation. 
Exchange rate forwards 
are most important. 
Options are new. 
Colombia  Y/N  N    Incipient  derivatives 
market. 
Mexico  Y/Y    Y  N  Use of interest rate 

























Annex Table A6 (cont) 
Hedging or credit risk transfer instruments 
  Exchange rate/ 
interest rate risk  Exchange-traded  New financial 
instruments 
Government-supplied 
instruments  Notes 
Venezuela N/N  N  Credit-linked  notes 
backed by government 
debt issued in foreign 
currency. 
  CLNs. Banks sell to 
domestic residents in 
local currency. 
Reduce interest rate 
mismatch but create 
currency mismatch. 
Small and OTC. 
Underdeveloped. Some 
unsuccessful attempts to 
offer instruments against 
foreign exchange risks. 
Czech Republic  Y/Y  Y  Small credit derivatives, 
CDOs and ABSs. 
 Standardised 
instruments preferred in 
closing open positions 
because cheaper. 
Hungary  Y/Y    Export  Credit  Insurance 
Ltd. Provides exchange 
rate risk insurance 
facilities for domestic 
exporters and travel 
agencies. 
Interest rate derivatives 
market relatively 
shallow. Deep short 
maturity (to one week) 
foreign exchange swaps 
market (average daily 
turnover EUR 2 billion) 
modestly affects interest 
rate exposure. 
Poland  Y/Y  Y    Moderate  liquidity  in 
standardised 
instruments. Banks often 
do back-to-back hedging 
with their parent. 
Turkey  Y/Y  Y  Draft mortgage law to 
allow for MBSs. 
Promotion and enabling 
regulation. 
























Annex Table A6 (cont) 
Hedging or credit risk transfer instruments 
  Exchange rate/ 
interest rate risk  Exchange-traded  New financial 
instruments 
Government-supplied 
instruments  Notes 
Saudi Arabia  Y/Y      No role except 
promotion of markets. 
 
Israel Y/Y  Y Structured  products 
(deposits with yield 
linked to defined 




Bank of Israel issues: 
shekel options, shekel-
dollar swaps, future 
treasury notes, repos. 
Liquidity and volume are 
a concern. 
Note: Exchange-traded instruments will generally include equities and commodities. ABSs:  asset-backed securities; CDOs:  collateralised debt obligations; CDSs: credit default swaps; 
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Table A7 
Average ratings for major banks in emerging markets
1 
Fitch individual ratings  Fitch long-term foreign currency 
(LTFC) ratings 
  1999 2004 1999 2004 
Argentina 42.5  0.0 51.1  8.7 
Brazil 42.5  41.7  39.1  47.8 
Chile 68.8  71.9  73.9  75.7 
Colombia 25.0  43.8  56.5  52.2 
Mexico 20.8  44.6  52.2  60.9 
Venezuela 43.8  30.0    40.9 
             
China   10.8    62.3 
Hong Kong SAR  65.3  61.7  77.4  74.6 
India   25.4    56.5 
Indonesia 0.0  28.4   43.5 
Korea 12.5  47.5  63.8  70.0 
Malaysia 43.8  34.4   62.0 
Philippines 32.5  26.1    50.0 
Singapore 67.5  75.0  87.0  85.5 
Taiwan, China  53.6  34.1    67.1 
Thailand 5.0  25.0    59.8 
            
Czech Republic  25.0 45.8 66.7 79.7 
Hungary 50.0  37.5  69.6  80.4 
Poland 43.8  25.0  69.6  73.9 
Israel 62.5  41.7  73.9  68.1 
Russia 4.2  27.9  10.9  45.0 
Saudi Arabia  75.0  62.5    70.0 
South Africa  66.7  57.5    64.3 
Turkey 46.9  27.3    42.7 
1  End of period. Constructed according to a numerical scale, “0” indicates the lowest possible average rating and “100” 
indicates the highest possible average rating. Individual rating scale is A-E. Illustrative values: 11 approximately equals D/E, 
72 is a shade below a B. Fitch Ratings long-term foreign currency rating scale is AAA-D. An LTFC score of 39 is about a B; a 
score of 86 is a shade below AA–. 
Sources: Fitch Ratings; BIS calculations. 
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